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Cracks in the Firmament of Burma’s
Military Government: from unity
through coercion to buying support
DAVID C WILLIAMS
ABSTRACT Despite holding recent elections, Burma’s military government does

not intend to relinquish power; its new constitution guarantees the army the
right to do whatever it wants. Democracy will therefore not come to Burma
through legal, peaceful, incremental steps. Instead, democracy will come to
Burma outside the legal process, because the basis for the regime’s power has
changed, becoming markedly weaker. When it ﬁrst seized power in 1961, the
military was united and therefore able to rule through coercion alone. In the
past several decades, by contrast, the generals have increasingly sought to
purchase support by giving income and resource streams to key players. But if
people support the regime only because it pays them, they will stop doing so
when it stops paying. In recent years the regime has alienated many traditional
supporters by taking away the income and resource streams on which they had
come to rely. As these groups become alienated from the top generals, they may
turn to each other to forge new deals, and ultimately some may try to enlist the
people as political allies. Burma therefore ﬁts the most common pattern for
democratisation: it will come through elite defections rather than popular
insurrection.
The Burmese military government has kept ﬁrm control of the country for
decades, but two developments in 2010 have caused many to wonder how
long its tenure will continue. Speciﬁcally, the junta allowed elections to
national and regional legislatures in November,1 and soon thereafter it
released Aung San Suu Kyi, the symbolic and spiritual leader of Burma’s
democracy movement, from house arrest.2 On superﬁcial inspection, these
events might suggest that Burma has taken the ﬁrst steps towards genuine
democratisation. Although the path may be long, in this view, it is only a
matter of time before processes already in train push the junta to the margin
of Burmese political life.
Such an impression is misleading. Under the new constitution, which was
essentially authored by the junta itself, the military will remain in control and
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has the power to send the civilian government home. In addition,
constitutional amendments will in practice require the consent of the military
itself, so even if the civilian politicians—almost all of whom were handpicked by the junta—wanted to reduce the military’s role, they couldn’t.3 In
short, the junta clearly does not intend to relinquish the reins, and the normal
operation of Burma’s new legal and electoral processes will not bring
meaningful democracy. Any vision of a peaceful, incremental transition
within the extant legal framework is mistaken.
Nevertheless, it is more likely now than in recent years that a transition
may occur outside of normal legal processes, because the basis of the junta’s
power has become less stable over the decades. In comparison with other
military regimes, the Tatmadaw’s reign has proved remarkably durable for
two reasons. First, until recently, the military itself stayed uniﬁed because of
its perception that the country was genuinely in danger. The Tatmadaw
seized power during an extremely complicated civil war: ethnic insurgents
sought to detach portions of the country; leftist insurgents sought to overturn
the elected government; and when Kuomintang (KMT) elements retreated
into Burma, a low-level proxy war between China and the US seemed to be in
the oﬃng. In the face of this chaos, the military developed and inculcated an
ideology focused on the importance of internal unity to stave oﬀ the
disintegration of the country.4
Second, the military chose therefore initially to rule purely through
coercion, rather than through building a coalition with political and civil
society groups. These groups were themselves disunited and thus unable to
push for inclusion. In addition, in the early years the bulk of the population
did not strongly object to the military takeover because it was not then as
brutal as it would become. To some extent the junta could even portray itself
as the protector of the Burman majority population against the ethnic
insurgents.5 As a result, the leading generals held a virtual monopoly of
power; there were no other signiﬁcant players.
In recent decades, however, the situation has changed. On the one hand,
the threat level has gone down: the KMT and the communist insurgency are
no more, and the ethnic armies have been seriously weakened. As a result,
military unity suﬀered, and the leading generals started to struggle with each
other for control. On the other hand, as the regime’s conduct became more
brutal and arbitrary, more of the population became alienated and, as the
strength of the ethnic forces diminished, so did the threat. Finally, with the
rise of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy,
Burma saw the birth of a broad-based democracy movement, which joined
hands with the ethnic armies. In short, power in Burma became less
monolithic.6
With growing internal disunity and external demands for reform, the
military needed new strategies to maintain control. In this situation some
regimes seek to build stable, inclusive political institutions that will deliver
general public goods, thus earning the support of the citizenry. When that
happens, the transition to a democratic and legitimate government has
begun. The regime in Burma, however, did not pursue that path. Instead, it
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provided income and resource streams to key supporters, thus buying their
allegiance, and to key opponents, thus buying oﬀ their resistance.7
In signiﬁcant measure the regime has thus become a system for the delivery
of bribes. First, the regime concluded ceaseﬁre agreements with most of the
ethnic armies, giving them certain economic opportunities in exchange for
peace. Next, it allowed the regional commanders the freedom to extract
income and resources from the civilians in their respective areas of control.
Finally, the highest-ranking generals developed personalist and rivalrous
networks of supporters, manoeuvring their people into key posts in exchange
for their loyalty.8
But buying the allegiance of supporters is a risky game, and the next few
years may show the risks. If people support a regime only because it provides
them with tangible rewards, they may stop supporting that regime if the
rewards dry up or if someone else oﬀers them a better deal. If they become
used to being bribed, they will be unhappy when the bribes dry up.
And in the past few years the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)
has made a lot of elites—people who have in the past supported or at least
not resisted the regime—quite unhappy. First, it has repudiated the ceaseﬁres
with the ethnic resistance armies, some of whom possess considerable ﬁghting
strength.9 Second, it has forced some oﬃcers to resign from the army so that
they could take up civilian seats in the legislature, thus moving them from the
most powerful governmental institution to one of the least powerful.10 Third,
it has failed to keep the army itself well supplied and well fed.11 Fourth, it has
created a whole new class of players—the legislators in the union, state, and
regional parliaments—who will soon be demanding their own income
streams, separate from the military’s.12 If these elites go in search of a better
deal—as some have already started to do—Burma’s politics will become ever
more ﬂuid. If enough of them make new deals with each other, they could
develop the power to displace the military regime.
This article will consider that possibility. Like buying political support,
prognostication is always risky, especially with respect to Burma, because
information is always in short supply. In considering this possibility, I draw
on published reports but also on my experience in working with the Burma
democracy movement for almost 10 years. In that role I have had access to
unusual sources of information. For example, I regularly advise the
Military Alliance and the Committee to Eﬀectuate a Federal Union, two
umbrella groups that include almost all the ethnic armies. I have also been
inside the areas of Burma wracked by war or controlled by insurgent
organisations.
The next section explains that, under the new constitution, the military still
controls the government and can block constitutional change. The following
section examines the military’s original strategy of holding power through
internal unity and external coercion. The third section explains the regime’s
more recent strategy of buying support by providing income and resource
streams. The ﬁnal section then examines the recent developments that have
made that basis of power less stable, and considers the possibility of a new
alliance that could oust the junta from power.
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Incremental change through constitutional means?
The new Burmese constitution, authored by a compliant convention and
adopted by a sham referendum in 2008, ensures that the military will remain
the dominant power in the country. I have analysed the new constitution at
greater length elsewhere,13 so a somewhat cursory overview will suﬃce here.
First, the constitution gives the military a substantial share in the civilian
government: serving soldiers comprise 25 per cent of the members of every
legislative chamber, and the commander-in-chief appoints the ministers of
defence, home aﬀairs and border aﬀairs.14 Second, and more importantly, the
military will serve as a separate and independent government within its own,
very broadly assigned domain.15
Thus, the civilian government may not seek to control the military: ‘The
Defence Services has [sic] the right to independently administer and
adjudicate all aﬀairs of the armed forces.’16 Even the Constitutional Tribunal
must keep its hands oﬀ: Article 46 gives the tribunal the power to
review executive and legislative action but notably omits reference to military
action.
Within its sphere, then, the military will be supreme. And the constitution
deﬁnes the scope of that sphere in language that is both expansive and vague:
the military shall ‘participate in the National political leadership role of the
state’,17 and it shall have the power to safeguard ‘the non-disintegration of
the Union, the non-disintegration of National solidarity and the perpetuation
of sovereignty’.18 That particular phrasing is important for two reasons.
First, it is elastic enough to mean whatever the military wants it to mean, so
even if the Tatmadaw stays strictly within constitutional bounds, it has carte
blanche. Second, it casts the military in a particular constitutional role: the
army is the institution that centrally holds the country together. As we will
see, that role grows out of a particular historical experience: the military
seized power in the ﬁrst place so as to impose order on what it perceived to be
chaos.
The constitutional provisions dealing with states of emergency assign the
same role to the army. In settled times the Tatmadaw must safeguard nondisintegration and sovereignty, but the civilian government will still function.
In unsettled times the Tatmadaw can go further: if necessary to safeguard
non-disintegration and sovereignty, it can suspend the operation of the
civilian government and rule solo. Article 40(c) provides:
If there arises a state of emergency that could cause disintegration of the Union,
disintegration of national solidarity and loss of sovereign power or attempts
therefore by wrongful forcible means such as insurgency or violence, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services has the right to take over and
exercise State sovereign power in accord with the provisions of this
Constitution.

In other words, the Tatmadaw can do whatever it wants to protect nondisintegration and sovereignty, apparently because it alone can be trusted to
keep the country intact.
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It should be noted parenthetically that at a diﬀerent point, the constitution
does provide that, before it can send the civilian government home, the
Tatmadaw must secure presidential agreement,19 and it must eventually
secure legislative ratiﬁcation.20 But these requirements ﬂatly contradict
Article 40(c), quoted above, which gives the commander-in-chief alone ‘the
right to take over’. Faced with a conﬂict between constitutional provisions,
the commander-in-chief is likely to decide that he has the freedom promised
by Article 40, rather than the constraints imposed by Articles 417 and 420.
He will be especially likely to choose this interpretation because,
traditionally, the Tatmadaw has seen parliamentary government as itself
the source of disorder and even chaos. Indeed, as we will see, the military has
embraced a particular, and now orthodox, vision of its assumption of power:
the army dissolved the civilian government precisely because the government’s fractiousness was itself part of the maelstrom threatening to tear the
country apart.21 In other words, in order to safeguard non-disintegration, the
military may feel that it must rule alone for two distinct reasons. First, in
some circumstances, it will need the freedom to act promptly and boldly, and
parliament may be too cumbersome to deal with the threat. Second, in other
circumstances parliament will itself be the threat, so that suspending it is the
only way to counter the threat. But if parliamentary government is the
problem to which a state of emergency is the solution, it would make no sense
to give parliamentary government the power to veto a military takeover. Or
so the commander-in-chief is likely to reason.
The 2008 Constitution can thus be understood not merely as a set of rules to
structure government but also as a key to discerning the military’s perception
of itself and the political world that it inhabits. As it has for many years, the
junta believes that Burma is always on the eve of destruction. Monsters of
disorder prowl around the margins of the junta’s psyche and keep them awake
at night. Only the discipline and force of the army can keep them at bay, and
the army must therefore be ever vigilant and ever ready to take control.
Civilian governments may be allowed to exist some of the time, when the
danger is not too acute, but the military will make the determination when and
how. The army is the country’s only permanent safeguard.
And the 2008 constitution ensures that the military will occupy that role
for as long as it wants. The constitution does make provision for
amendments, so theoretically the constitutional power of the army could
be reduced.22 But a constitutional amendment requires support from
75 per cent of the members of each of the houses of Parliament.23 Because
the military itself appoints 25 per cent of the members of each chamber,
amendments will not be possible without army votes.24 The Tatmadaw’s
power cannot be reduced unless the Tatmadaw decides that its power should
be reduced.
In short, then, the constitution does not permit a transition to a genuinely
democratic and civilian government. As it stands, the constitution gives the
army power to do whatever it wants, including the power to ensure that the
constitution is never changed. And the constitution also reveals the military’s
intentions: the junta still does not trust civilian governments, and it does not
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intend to surrender power. Change cannot occur incrementally and peacefully through the normal operation of Burmese law.
Internal unity and external coercion
Although new, the 2008 constitution grows out of the military’s recollection
of the past. It carries the shadow of a particular spectre: the military seized
power at a time when many worried that civil war was about to split the
country into pieces. The Tatmadaw claimed to be the only force capable of
keeping the country together, because it alone possessed the practical power
and spiritually embodied the country as a whole. Clearly, the 2008
constitution takes the same view of the military’s role: it has the right and
responsibility to prevent social breakdown.
That self-understanding goes back at least to the 1950s when, in the
military’s mind, Burma was becoming so fractured along so many lines that
only drastic action could save the country. Before Britain conquered it, the
area that now comprises Burma was never a single political system. Rather,
the Burman kings had tried to establish dominance over other peoples—the
ethnic minorities—in the areas surrounding the Burman heartland, but those
peoples had never been wholly integrated into the Burman polity.25 After
independence many of the ethnic minorities wanted either independence or at
least strong local autonomy, but they received neither. The Karen quickly
took up arms; the Mon and Pa-o shortly joined them. Eventually, all the
other large ethnic minorities would ﬁeld their own resistance armies. The
Tatmadaw thus spent its early years locked in battle with a formidable Karen
adversary that, at one point, threatened Rangoon itself.26
Meanwhile, in Rangoon, the Communist Party split into the more radical
White Flags and the less radical Red Flags. The Red Flags quickly went into
resistance. For a time, the White Flags remained a part of the APFPL, the
dominant centrist party that controlled the government, but eventually the
party expelled them. Locked out, they too took up arms and took to the hills.
They were soon joined by remnant People’s Volunteer Organisations (PVOs).
At the end of World War II, Aung San—the army’s leader during the war
and the government’s leader after it—formed these PVOs from demobilised
soldiers to serve as his personal army. After his assassination, they became
free-ﬂoating private militias.27 Together the communists and the PVOs
constituted a less severe threat than the Karen, but they still added to the list
of armed groups facing the Tatmadaw.
To make matters worse, after the collapse of the Nationalist Chinese
government in 1949, remnants of the Kuomintang moved into Shan State,
where the American CIA trained and supplied them to invade Yunnan. After
three failed attempts the KMT turned around and advanced on central
Burma. To stop the advance, the Tatmadaw had to ﬁght on yet another
front. Even after the advance was halted, the KMT threatened Burma’s
security, because its presence in the country risked a proxy war between the
USA and China on Burmese soil. The KMT also became one of the biggest
narco-traﬃcking groups in the world.28
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Finally, in 1958, the AFPFL itself split into two factions—the Stable AFPFL
and the Clean AFPFL. The army primarily supported the Stable group, but
the Cleans controlled the government under the prime minister, U Nu, and
had many supporters in the police and local militias. Tension rose rapidly,
and when army leaders informed Nu that Burma had become a powder-keg,
he agreed to surrender power to a military caretaker government headed by
General Ne Win. The so-called Bogyoke (or ‘general’) government ruled with
greater eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness than had the parliamentary government,
with some genuine achievements to its credit, including improved sanitation,
decreased corruption, and police reform.29 In 1960 Ne Win permitted
elections, which returned Nu to power at the head of the new Pyidaungsu (or
‘Union’) Party. But the Union Party itself split, and when Nu began to
reverse the policies introduced by the caretaker government, the military
again seized power in 1962, this time for good.30
Thus the army took control during a time of tremendous socio-political
fracturing, and its own justiﬁcation for the seizure was that only the military
could keep the country together. U Nu had been in negotiations with ethnic
minority leaders to create a looser federal structure, which would have
allowed the minorities greater home rule.31 Immediately after the takeover,
army leaders explained that, if those negotiations had borne fruit, the
country would have fallen to pieces—literally—so the army had to intervene.
Underneath the military’s aversion to federalism was an even deeper
aversion to all forms of disorder, including democracy itself. The military
repeatedly explained that democracy allowed self-serving politicians to
pursue their own separate agendas, so that the only result could be discord
and factionalisation. The problem was not just that parliamentary democracy
was too weak to deal with the problem of discord; it was that parliamentary
democracy was part of the problem. To avoid sociopolitical breakdown,
Burma needed a more disciplined and uniﬁed power structure. The answer to
civilian disunity was military unity.32 Thus, as early as 1958, the army
released a critique of the constitution that was widely inﬂuential within the
military: ‘What we dread most is that unscrupulous politicians and deceitful
Communist rebels and their allies may take advantage of these ﬂaws,
weaknesses, contradictions, and inadequacies in the Constitution and bring
about in the country gangster political movements, syndicalism, anarchism
and a totalitarian regime.’33
From that day to this, the military has rehearsed this interpretation of
Burma’s ﬁrst years of independence and the birth of the present regime:
parliamentary government could not prevent the disintegration of the
country; only the military stands between the nation and chaos.34 As already
noted, the 2008 constitution rests on this interpretation of history as well:
should a threat to national solidarity arise, the military has the power to do
anything it wants to deal with it, because parliamentary government cannot
be trusted so to do. The military has created a civilian government, but it still
does not trust that government to keep the country from falling apart.
To govern with unity, the military adopted a two-fold approach: internally
it managed to achieve internal cohesion, while externally it eliminated all
1205

DAVID C WILLIAMS

independent organisations and institutions so that it could rule through
coercion rather than through compromise. In the internal dimension, in its
early years, the military government was remarkably free of the internecine
struggle that has come to be so characteristic of its later years. The military
had become uniﬁed as a consequence of facing threats from a variety of
sources: the ethnic armies, the KMT, the communists and parliamentary
politicians. In this early period, the threats were real, and the army could not
take its own power for granted. It was therefore forced by dint of
circumstance to achieve cohesion.35 In addition, as the military watched
Burmese political parties ﬁssure again and again, they took away the lesson
that unity was the supreme value. As the leading historian of the Tatmadaw
in this period explains: ‘By the time of the 1962 coup, the army had become a
standing, bureaucratized, and centralized institution, capable of eliminating
such challenges over its claims to state power.’36
In the external dimension the military government systematically
eliminated all potential rivals for power.37 It outlawed political parties other
than the Burma Sociality Programme Party (BSPP), the Tatmadaw’s alter ego,
and eventually would discard even that one.38 It brought the ethnic states
directly under central control, terminating the local councils that had had a
hand in governing the states.39 Although the party created mass organisations, such as workers’ and youth groups, these had no power; they allowed
Burmese people to participate only in the work that the junta had prescribed
for them and they functioned primarily to indoctrinate citizens and control
their labour.40 Because the party vetted all candidates, elections were not
genuine contests for power but were instead processes to socialise voters into
the values of the state.41 The military also took steps to reduce the political
power of Buddhist monks.42 Few people tried to resist, but when they did, the
regime responded with immediate and severe violence; the history of the
repression of student protests has been especially long and bloody.43
Instead of bringing civil society groups into a broad coalition, the junta
simply took away all their independence; it ruled through coercion, not
compromise. It was the more able to do so because it met surprisingly little
resistance, aside from the ethnic armies.44 As noted, Burmese political parties
had ﬁssured over and over, so there was no uniﬁed mass movement that
could resist. But in the early years it is not clear that ordinary Burmans would
have wanted to resist even if they could. During its previous time in power,
the military had governed relatively well, and in the early years of its second
time in power, the ethnic armies were still threatening. As a result, the regime
had only limited occasion to use the brutality that would later become its
trademark.
This combination of internal unity and external coercion served the
military government well. During a period when one autocratic government
after another succumbed to democratic revolution, the regime clung to
power; the names changed, but the fundamental fact of military dominance
did not. Today Burma seems almost anachronistic, a hangover from an age
when democracy had not yet become a universal norm. Given this resilience,
some have concluded that the military can hang on to power as long as it
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wants, and as the previous section explained, it apparently wants to hang on
forever. But, again, impressions can be misleading, because, although the
military’s original strategy for retaining power worked well, it has since
moved to a diﬀerent strategy that is likely to prove less stable.
Buying support
As the decades have passed, the military government has found it
increasingly diﬃcult to rule by coercion alone, both because its own internal
unity began to unravel and because new democratic forces posed
unprecedented threats to its legitimacy. It was forced to ﬁnd other ways to
muster support or at least compliance. Although it continued to use coercion
against some of the ethnic armies and even peaceful protesters, it increasingly
sought to secure its power base by delivering income and resource streams to
key supporters. In other words, although once it could demand support, now
it must pay for it.
As the government’s policies became increasingly heavy-handed and
arbitrary, they plunged the country into economic immiseration. Finally, in
1988, protests spread across Burma so pervasively that the military felt
unable to control them. Instead, it allowed an election, which it lost by a wide
margin to the National League for Democracy, a new party led by the
extremely popular Aung San Suu Kyi. The military refused to allow the
parliament to sit, but for the ﬁrst time it faced active resistance in the Burman
heartland. Troops were needed to keep order in central Burma and also to
ﬁght the ethnic armies in the hills, as urban activists began to forge links with
the resistance groups.45 Doubtless the military government recalled the bad
old days after independence when it had to ﬁght on many fronts at once.
To avert that fate, the government—now named the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC)—entered ceaseﬁre agreements with some of the
more powerful ethnic armies in the 1990s.46 Most of the agreements were
unwritten, but the terms tended to be the same. On the one hand, the
insurgents kept their arms but agreed not to attack the regime’s forces. And
on the other side, the junta agreed not to attack the insurgents and allowed
them substantial self-government, including the power to extract income. For
example, many of the ceaseﬁre groups controlled part of Burma’s
international boundary with China or Thailand; these groups taxed the
cross-border trade in teak, electronic equipment, drugs and other commodities. Other ethnic armies became narco-traﬃckers, though it should be
emphasised that many of the armies speciﬁcally repudiated the drug trade. In
eﬀect, the junta bought oﬀ the resistance of these groups by giving them most
of what they had been ﬁghting for.47
Next, the central governing body of the regime—ﬁrst called SLORC, then
later the SPDC—devolved power to the regional commanders. In their ability
to govern the areas under their control without check, these commanders
became virtual feudal lords over the area under their jurisdiction.48 Over time
these commanders became increasingly alienated from the centre, which
they—accurately—thought was detached from the ﬁghting and interested
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only in patronage politics.49 But, in fact, the commanders were themselves
part of the spoils system: when the SPDC devolved power to the commanders,
it also gave them the power to extract income and resources from the people
whom they governed. As a result, the commanders became extremely wealthy
and powerful. As one commentator explains, ‘Anyone who travels outside
Rangoon can see the mansions, luxury cars, and royalty-like treatment of
these oﬃcers’.50 Again, in eﬀect, the SPDC bought the support of these
commanders, rather than merely demanding their loyalty to a uniﬁed
command structure as had been done in the past.
Finally, the SPDC itself became divided because of the personal ambition
and business rivalry of its leading ﬁgures. Before the events of 1988, Ne Win
exercised complete control over the government but, with his departure, none
of his successors has held such monopolistic power. During the 1990s, after
the ceaseﬁre agreements, the army moved its focus from ﬁghting to business.
Several business organisations owned by the Tatmadaw came to dominate
the formal economy, and they allowed the junta leaders to become extremely
wealthy. But the opportunities to become rich also brought increased
competition for the spoils.51
Since 1988, although the military government has always had a single
overall leader, that leader has never been able completely to eliminate his
rivals. Thus, Saw Maung succeeded Ne Win but, when he became unstable,
Than Shwe and Khin Nyunt competed to replace him. Than Shwe eventually
prevailed, but Khin Nyunt remained in the government, manoeuvring to
advance his own agenda.52 His rivalry with Maung Aye, the third of the
ruling troika, then intensiﬁed. By the early part of this millennium, Khin
Nyunt brieﬂy appeared to be in the ascendant when he replaced Than Shwe
as prime minister, but shortly thereafter Than Shwe purged Khin Nyunt and
thousands of his supporters.53 Since that time Than Shwe and Maung Aye
have competed for control, although the rivalry has never erupted into open
conﬂict.
To secure their power base, these top leaders manoeuvre to place those
loyal to them in positions of inﬂuence. In other words, the military
government is not a single uniﬁed command structure; it is a collection of
competing networks of patronage and inﬂuence. The power of each
particular network waxes and wanes over time relative to the others. The
top generals depend on these followers for their own power; without them,
the generals would be helpless in a competition with the others. To keep their
followers loyal, the generals reward them by giving them access to income
and resource streams, usually from with their oﬃces.54 In other words, the
power of any given general depends on his ability to secure the appointment
of his people to oﬃces of inﬂuence and wealth.
And the networks themselves are neither wholly hierarchical nor perfectly
uniﬁed; the military government strongly resembles the multiple layers of a
feudal system. The top generals appoint high-ranking subordinates, who in
turn develop their own networks of followers, who owe their most immediate
loyalty to the people who appointed them. Sometimes tension breaks out
between the top generals and these more local networks. For example, the
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generals sometimes try to crack down on corruption by restricting the ability
of subordinates to extort resources from those around them. But corruption
is what makes the whole system work: the subordinates are loyal to the
generals only because they are allowed to extort. As a result, they have
generally refused to cut back on extortion, and open conﬂict sometimes
results. For example, in early 2002, two high-ranking oﬃcers conspired with
relatives of Ne Win ‘to protect their vast illicit empire by plotting a coup
against the junta’.55 The SPDC foiled the plot, but the very fact that the plot
occurred is testimony to the divisiveness of the military government.
In practice, buying support multiplies the players, people who might have
an inﬂuence on Burma’s future. So long as the regime was uniﬁed and
opposition disunited, the lines of command were clear and ran upwards to
one person—Ne Win—who called all the shots and could therefore rule
wholly through coercion. But as soon as the military government feels forced
to buy the support of people lower down the command hierarchy, it
empowers them to demand a reward for their services, rather than giving
unquestioning loyalty to the regime. In practice, buying support diﬀuses
power to some extent, and the diﬀusion of power is the ﬁrst necessary step
toward democratisation.
The basis of military power has shifted quite radically in Burma over the
past several decades. Although there are no signs of the junta’s imminent
demise, the new basis for power is markedly less stable than the old. If people
support the regime only because they are paid, they will continue to support
the regime only if they continue to be paid. If the regime gives a group access
to income or resource streams and then denies access, it could turn grateful
supporters into bitter enemies.
The fracturing of the regime?
In fact, that is precisely what the regime has been doing for the past several
years—extending privileges only to withdraw them from people whose
support the junta can ill aﬀord to lose. It has repudiated the ceaseﬁres, thus
driving the ceaseﬁre armies back into active resistance; it has alienated the
regional commanders by ordering them to launch campaigns that would be
costly and perhaps unwinnable; it has alienated some senior generals by
refusing to promote them as they thought they deserved; and it has alienated
other high-ranking oﬃcers by forcing them to resign from the army so as to
move into the parliament as civilian representatives. Finally, it has created a
new class of players: the members of parliament who belong to parties other
than the junta’s own, most of whom are ethnic minorities and are looking to
make a deal with other disgruntled persons.
When the ceaseﬁres were initially concluded, the junta held the view that
they would last only until a transition to a constitutional order. Indeed, for
the regime, part of the reason for adopting a nominally democratic
constitution was that the rest of the world would perceive Burma as a
‘normal’ country—ie not the sort of country that has ceaseﬁre agreements
with its own people. Accordingly, in the run-up to the referendum on the
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constitution, the SPDC informed the ceaseﬁre groups that it would revoke the
ceaseﬁres; the ethnic armies would be required to lay down their arms or else
become part of the Tatmadaw. Some of the armies took the latter option, but
most—including the most formidable—refused to do either.56 Overnight, the
junta turned these groups, which had been passively tolerant of the SPDC,
into enemies. The regime attacked a small group, the Kokang, creating a
wave of refugees who ﬂed into China, which reportedly instructed the junta
not to attack any groups on China’s border without China’s permission.57 At
the time of writing, the Tatmadaw is ﬁghting the Shan State Army—North58
and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army in Karen State.59 It has not yet
attacked the two largest groups, the United Wa State Army and the Kachin
Independence Army.
The sudden threat of attack united the ethnic armies as they had never
been before. The regime had given these ceaseﬁre groups a deal—home rule
and income in exchange for peace—and when the deal was suddenly
withdrawn, the groups looked for other partners to make other deals. Very
quickly the leaders of most of the ceaseﬁre and non-ceaseﬁre groups began to
meet to work out an alliance and, if possible, a joint strategy. They formed a
series of increasingly inclusive umbrella groups—ﬁrst the Military Alliance,
then the Committee to Eﬀectuate a Federal Union, and ﬁnally the
United Nationalities Federal Council, which has adopted a 16-page
constitution dividing the country into military regions.60 I have been present
at some of these meetings, and I have seen the documents that they have
produced.
Thus the regime has alienated the ceaseﬁre groups by threatening to attack
them. It has also alienated the regional commanders who must do the
attacking. These oﬃcers have lived lives very diﬀerent from their
predecessors. In the ceaseﬁre areas they have done little ﬁghting; even in
the non-ceaseﬁre areas they have generally attacked only civilian populations, avoiding conﬂict with the ethnic armies. Instead of ﬁghting, they have
dedicated their time to becoming rich, at which they have been markedly
successful. But now the regime has ordered them to shift priorities: with the
revocation of the ceaseﬁres, the regime has announced that it will attack the
ex-ceaseﬁre armies.
The regional commanders are clearly unhappy about this direction. It
would require them to focus on combat rather than proﬁt, and currently the
Tatmadaw is far from combat-ready. Although numerous, the soldiers are
mostly conscripts chosen by village leaders, who naturally sent the least
desirable young men. Consequently, morale is very low.61 In addition,
although military spending has been a large part of the government’s budget,
little of it seems to have been spent on the people who will be doing the
ﬁghting. Some soldiers are reportedly starving; military equipment is
everywhere in short supply; the desertion rate is rising.62 If the army actually
were to attack the larger ethnic armies, it is unlikely that it would prevail.
Many of the regional commanders blame Than Shwe; they believe that,
because he comes from a background in psychological operations, he does
not suﬃciently value front-line soldiers.
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The SPDC has set a series of deadlines for the ethnic armies to lay down
their arms. As each deadline passed, the regime did nothing except to set
another deadline. The SPDC reportedly ordered the regional commanders to
attack various groups, but the regional commanders refused because they
feared that they might lose the ensuing conﬂict. In short, the SPDC has
alienated the regional commanders just as it has alienated the ceaseﬁre
armies. In the past the regime has tried to keep control over the regional
commanders by reshuﬄing them, but it is not clear that this tactic will work
indeﬁnitely.63 The regional commanders are already proto-warlords; if the
gap between them and the central command widens, they could become
actual warlords, powers in their own right in their respective domains.
In addition, the centre itself appears to be becoming even less uniﬁed than
in the past. As noted, Than Shwe never had the monopoly on power that he
appeared to possess from the outside; he always had to deal with complicated
networks of power relations. Nevertheless, he clearly occupied the sole apex
of power. In the months since the election, his role has become less clear. He
has formally dissolved the SPDC, has resigned as commander-in-chief, and
rarely appears in public anymore. On the other hand, he chairs the new State
Supreme Council, a body nowhere mentioned in the constitution.64 Despite
this apparent lack of constitutional authority, it has propounded a number of
statutes to govern the operation of the legislature. It seems fair to conclude
that the State Supreme Council was created precisely to ensure that Than
Shwe remains in ultimate command, although he may withdraw from the
day-to-day operation of the government.
Nonetheless, his semi-retirement has clearly left something of a power
vacuum, and the contenders are now circling. The most powerful ﬁgure under
the constitution is the new commander-in-chief, Min Aung Hlaing.65 He is a
Than Shwe loyalist but, as Than Shwe ages, he will presumably become more
his own man. In choosing him, Than Shwe passed over Lt General Thura
Myint Aung, who was in line for the post because of seniority, but who was
thought to be less loyal to Than Shwe. When he was oﬀered the lesser post of
defence minister, he declined and was promptly placed under house arrest.
But he is popular with his fellow oﬃcers and has his own network of
supporters, who are now more alienated from the government, while other
high-ranking army oﬃcers are unhappy that Than Shwe has chosen to value
personal loyalty over military hierarchy.66 They too had been given a deal,
loyalty to the hierarchy in exchange for promotion according to hierarchical
principles, but Than Shwe has cavalierly revoked that deal. He is presumably
calculating that by up-ending the system of seniority, he has ensured that his
subordinates will not become too secure in their positions. That tactic may,
however, backﬁre if the senior generals start to look elsewhere for a better
deal.
The contest for power will also have a new participant: the new members
of parliament. Many of them are former oﬃcers, forced to resign their
commissions so that they could occupy the civilian seats in the legislature.
Many of these persons did not want to resign because reassignment to the
legislature involved a loss in prestige, power and particularly wealth.
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As part of the army, they had access to income and resource streams; in the
parliament they have nothing but limited salaries and beneﬁts. As noted
earlier, the legislature will have extremely limited formal power under the
constitution. Nonetheless, the legislators now have an extremely strong
incentive to develop their own income and resource streams, available to
them by virtue of their status as legislators. As a result, the army and the
legislature will probably come into direct competition for wealth. The army
will certainly be the victor if it manages to act in a uniﬁed way but, as
already explained, it is no longer uniﬁed. The oﬃcers-turned-legislators
were all part of power networks within the army; disgruntled current
oﬃcers might easily turn to them for allies should the military ﬁssures
widen.
Some already purport to see this new civilian power base in the person of
Thein Sein, the new president. In his ﬁrst months in oﬃce, he has spoken
against corruption and in favour of greater spending on health and
education. He has also appointed U Myint, a friend of Aung San Suu Kyi,
to chair the presidential advisory board on the economy.67 But so far he has
taken no concrete steps toward reform, so his words are more likely to be
merely window dressing to mask continuing military domination. He too
came to power as a Than Shwe loyalist, and in his inaugural speech he
emphasised above all the central role of the army in keeping the country
together and safe from ‘neo-colonialists’. He also identiﬁed as the ‘Three
Main National Causes’ those particular things that the constitution gives into
the military’s unrestricted care: non-disintegration of the union, nondisintegration of national solidarity and perpetuation of sovereignty.68 At
present at least, Thein Sein appears to be a puppet for the military forcesthat-be.
But, though the president may not form the nucleus of a civilian power
base, others more distant from the centre of power might. Of course,
precisely because they are farther from power, they have less ability to
eﬀectuate change and more need for tactical alliances. And one last group
has still less power and more need: the members of parliament who belong to
political parties other than those backed by the military. These MPs are
mostly from ethnic minorities and belong to parties organised to promote the
interests of particular ethnic groups. The SPDC presumably allowed them to
win so as to give the illusion of an ethnically inclusive parliament. They have
very little power by virtue of their oﬃce: the legislature itself is virtually
powerless, and they constitute only a small fraction of it. But they might play
an important linking function. Some of them have close connections to ethnic
minority communities and even the ethnic resistance armies. If the ex-oﬃcers
in the parliament build bridges to disgruntled commanders, the ethnic MPs
could help to broaden that alliance to leaders of the ethnic minorities.
And these MPs too feel that they have been given a raw deal: despite
considerable pressure to boycott, they agreed to participate in the elections in
the expectation of having some inﬂuence, however small; instead, they are
being housed in prison-like conditions and given no opportunity to aﬀect
policy.
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Conclusion
None of these groups could bring down the military regime on its own. That
fact is, however, good news. If any one of them could merely seize power on
its own, it would probably rule on its own as well, becoming yet another in
Burma’s string of autocratic governments. Because only an alliance could
unseat the junta, the elements of the alliance will have to accommodate each
other’s agendas—not out of a commitment to pluralism but simply out of
practical necessity. Such messy, self-interested alliances against tyranny are
the stuﬀ of which democracy is born. The even better news is that the regime
has given all these groups an incentive to resist. The military junta has in fact
managed this transition rather artlessly. Having secured its power base by
buying support, it decided that it didn’t want to pay anymore. But that move
has left a large number of disgruntled players on the board of
Burmese politics. And these players are not the usual opponents of the
regime, such as Aung San Suu Kyi or the non-ceaseﬁre armies, but
supporters whom the regime can little aﬀord to alienate. If those players
manage to work out a new deal, the junta may be in trouble. The regime has
stayed in power for so long that its tenure has come to seem eternal and
untouchable. For that reason, it cannot be said with any conﬁdence that the
junta will shortly expire. But it can be said that, because of the junta’s own
mistakes, conditions are more propitious for a transition than they have been
for a long time.
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